The simplest approach to identify in relation to Gay Marriage is one that could be called “Logical” and is an approach that is held by both proponents for and against Gay Marriage. I classify this approach as “Logical” as it tends to naturally and instinctively follow from one’s views on homosexuality itself. If one perceives homosexuality as a sexual practice to be morally legitimate and equally valid to heterosexuality as a sexual practice, then for many it logically follows to be in support of Gay Marriage. The reasoning being: why should a moral and valid way of practicing one’s sexual life and developing love relations be proscribed from the normative socio-economic institution of organizing and recognizing such committed relations, namely marriage? Conversely, if one holds homosexual sexual practice to be morally illegitimate and beyond the pale of how one is to practice one’s sexuality and develop one’s love relations, then for many it logically follows that Gay Marriage should not be allowed to become an institution in this country.

The second approach in relation to Gay Marriage is a more complex one and could be called “Neutralized”. This as well is an approach that can be held by both proponents for and against Gay Marriage. For example, a religious Jew or Christian who understands their Bible to prohibit homosexual sex and further understands these religious traditions not to recognize such marriages when and where they occur could nevertheless politically support Gay Marriage. How is this tenable? Such a person could take the view that what constitutes moral sexual behavior and what are valid bonds between humans fall under the domain of religion and as the United States is constructed with an intended Separation between Church/Synagogue/Mosque and State the Federal Government should not dictate what these sexual norms and the sociological institutions that emerge from them should be. To do so would violate, in their minds, limits that the Government should respect in relation to its authority and jurisdiction. In short, one can hold one’s religious belief to be true but one can neutralize such a religious belief in the political sphere and not use the instrumentation of Government and Politics to impose it on another. I classify this approach as “Neutralized” as the individual who holds such an approach essentially has one political principle they respect neutralize another religious principle they hold dear. The latter, left to its own devices would lead to the more “Logical” approach elucidated prior.

Likewise, a person who believes that homosexual sex is morally legitimate and supports the idea of Gay Marriage could take the view that this country, informed as it is by a Judeo-Christian heritage, in the construction of its Constitution and laws never intended to allow men and women to marry persons of the same sex and that the Founding Fathers could not conceive of this as being a restriction of their equality or pursuit of happiness. They would further recognize that there are other laws in this country that can trace their roots or influence to the Judeo-Christian heritage, for example the illegality to commit suicide and practice euthanasia and these laws as well could equally be overturned among others if we seek to neuter this country from any religious moral influence whatsoever affecting its laws. The reasoning goes: If we seek to legalize Gay Marriage and divorce the country from its former moral underpinnings on the issue, what laws will be next? This individual could take the view that while they personally disagree with the religious basis for the current predominant definition and legal status of marriage they nevertheless do not believe that this is what the Founding Fathers were concerned with when they established the Separation between Church and State and nor is it what they conceived of when they were enshrining as core values of this country equality, freedom and the pursuit of happiness. Here as well, this approach shows the “Neutralized” quality I refer to, as one principle in this case their understanding of the Constitution and their belief about how it should be interpreted neutralizes what their belief about the moral validity of homosexual sex and marriage would “logically” lead to.

People can also take an approach that this is a “States Rights” issue and put their personal and or religious views aside and take a principled Political/Constitutional stand as to how they see this country is supposed to function when an issue is not clearly and unambiguously addressed in the Constitution. In this case as well this would be another example of a “Neutralized” perspective.

Lastly there is an approach that can be classified as ”Triage”. In this approach the person regardless of their view on homosexual sex and Gay Marriage and regardless of their views on the Constitution and its interpretation see the country as in need of a certain kind of “Change”. In light of this desired change they put aside their views on the above issues and subordinate their decision around Same Sex Marriage to what they deem most critical for the country as a whole. For example, an otherwise Socially Liberal Democrat could feel that this country needs a new economic direction and vote for Romney with the hope that Mr. Romney will bring a different approach to resolving the current economic distress we are facing.  Alternatively, a moderate Republican could feel that the Grand Old Party has taken a very scary direction and would prefer President Obama’s general policies and tone than what the Tea Party, Religious Right and Conservative Republicans are offering. In the “Triage” approach Gay Marriage while an important issue is not viewed as a critical issue and they relegate it to a secondary status in their politics.

In general, people who galvanize around the “Logical” approach tend to construct this issue in terms of “Good vs. Evil” or “Progress vs. Fundamentalism”. They also tend to bring significant energy to the debate with very strong and at times hardened views. Individuals in the other approaches described tend to be less committed one way or the other and are less useful in steering the issue one way or another, as the momentum on this issue is usually being dictated by activists within each camp or political expediency feeding such activism.

It seems that our Presidential candidates are each appealing at present to an element of their base of support and are taking the “Logical” view on this issue- logical that is to those individuals who hold deep convictions one way or the other on Homosexual Sex and Marriage and what naturally follows for them from these views. One of the consequences of the discourse being constructed to those within the “Logical” approach is that there are many people who will stand aside from the debate and leave it to the extremes within each approach to battle till kingdom or utopia comes. I am not convinced that this is what is best for the country or for our public discourse but I am convinced its plenty good for Talk Radio and the news Media who have their cliché images and sound bites with which to bombard us.

By and large, I seem to have made more mistakes than any others of whom I know, but have learned thereby to make ever swifter acknowledgment of the errors and thereafter immediately set about to deal more effectively with the truths disclosed by the acknowledgment of erroneous assumptions.”  R. Buckminster Fuller

The least questioned assumptions are often the most questionable.” Paul Broca

The Babylonian Talmud in Bava Batra 88b and Yevamot 21A teaches in the name of Rabbi Levi, ”More difficult is the Divine punishment for transgressing the Torah’s prohibitions regarding deception in weights and measures than that of the Divine punishment for transgressing the Torah’s prohibitions regarding forbidden sexual relations…”

The Talmud concludes that the basis of the more severe Divine punishment meted out for transgressing the prohibition of deception in weights and measures (Leviticus 19:35-36) is that this unethical interpersonal sin has inherent obstacles to complete and authentic repentance.  Forbidden sexual relations, though, can be atoned for completely, as these are sins conceived of as between a person and God (See Tosafot Harosh and Meiri ad loc.) and often are isolated incidences with known persons. With regards to the transgression of employing false weights and measures: while atonement from God is both necessary and possible, atonement from the individuals one has deceived and stolen from, while definitively necessary, is deemed not completely possible. Firstly, one is not capable of determining all the individuals wronged and secondly, the exact amount wrongfully gained is incalculable.  Even, as the Talmud suggests, dedicating the estimated funds wrongfully gained to the needs of the public does not quite right the wrong in the ideal way.

The Rambam in Sefer Nezikin Hilkhot Geneivah 7:12 clearly articulates the perspective that forbidden sexual relations are a matter between a person and God. He writes,  ”More difficult is the Divine punishment for transgressing the Torah’s prohibitions regarding deception in weights and measures than that of the Divine punishment for transgressing the Torah’s prohibitions regarding forbidden sexual relations for this sexual relations is between a person and God and this weights and measures is between a person and a person.”

The modern person may be perplexed in contemplating the notion that sexual prohibitions, such as adultery or incest, are perceived within the rabbinic view as  matters between a person and God. How can the rabbis see having sexual relations with another man’s wife as not being a sin that is an interpersonal violation? Is this not, as the contemporary reasoning goes, stealing another man’s wife (or infringing on his partnership, if you prefer)?

How can the rabbis consider incestuous relations between a father and his daughter or a mother and her son etc… not an interpersonal sin but rather one that is exclusively between an individual and God?

Human beings make assumptions. Religious human beings have a tendency to make moral assumptions.  We have a tendency to assume that the way that we conceive of moral reality per force is always the way it has been and should be conceived of. How could one conceive of adultery or incest as anything other than an interpersonal wrong? Perhaps it is also a Divine wrong, but to exclude the human element seems difficult. The intention of this article is to question our moral assumptions to the extent that we hold them as absolute fixtures of human reality and in so far as they are unhelpful in understanding the Biblical and Rabbinic tradition and to explore the implications of reading the Biblical text in light of its original context.

Simply said, the moral culture of Ancient Egypt and Canaanite societies, the civilizations in which Israel as a people was nurtured and among whom they lived, had a radically different view of sexual morality than we do. Based on pagan mythology and Near-Eastern socio-political philosophy, these cultures not only didn’t consider sexual relations that the Torah deemed immoral as such, but they perceived them as “The way of the Gods” or a ritual enactment of their mythic beliefs. (see The Sociology of Religion by Max Weber)

• What we call adultery was for them at times potentially part of a fertility rite or its orgiastic aftermath, and it was inherently assumed that one would share one’s wife with another man in such a context.
• What we call “incest” derived from the Latin “Incestus” with a general meaning of impure or unchaste was for Egyptian royalty a sanctioned and valued strategy for keeping the royal family lineage within its own exclusive circle. (see article The Labyrinth of Kinship by Jack Goody in the New Left Review)
•  There was no moral disdain for these practices anymore than there was no moral disdain for having sex with animals as part of the same religious-magical rites. (see Beastiality section in Forbidden Sexual Behavior and Morality by Robert E.L. Masters)

Civilization at the time of the giving of the Torah simply did not conceive of these sexual activities as being fundamentally immoral and, as well, not specifically a wrong that one person harms another by engaging in when performed in the sanctioned contexts of that society. While this is incredible to consider, given our current moral assumptions, it will not require Einsteinian thought experiments to demonstrate, as the Biblical, Rabbinic and Midrashic sources clearly confirm, this academic understanding.

Firstly, let us turn to the Bible itself in Leviticus 18, the section of the Bible that introduces the broad range of forbidden sexual relations. We read, “God spoke to Moses, telling him to speak to the Israelites, and say to them: I am God. Do not follow the ways of Egypt where you once lived, nor of Canaan, where I will be bringing you. Do not follow [any] of their customs. Follow My laws and be careful to keep My decrees [for] I am God your Lord. Keep My decrees and laws, since it is only by keeping them that a person can [truly] live. I am God.” (The Living Torah translation, Kaplan).

The Bible then goes on to identify all forbidden sexual relations, beginning with incest, moving along to prohibitions of sex with a menstruating woman, adultery, male homosexuality, and bestiality of any kind. The Bible sternly and severely concludes the section as follows, ”Do not let yourselves be defiled by any of these acts. It was as a result of them that the nations that I am driving away before you became defiled…” It seems quite clear from the Biblical text above that these prohibited sexual customs were a way of life for the Egyptians and Canaanites. As such, they would certainly not see them as wrong in relation to the divine, but as well in their interpersonal relations, they could not conceive of any moral flaw.

Indeed the careful reader will notice that the Torah in the introductory section to this sexual code states that by keeping God’s decrees and laws, one will “Live”. Why would I assume otherwise? Why do I need to be told that I will live if I abstain from all these sexual practices? These practices were seen as the way to attaining a life of abundance and blessing and included the very fertility rites and mythic sexual enactments played out in these pagan societies, as well as their schemas for preserving their political, economic, and sexual dominance. (Regarding the latter see Dr. Jacob Milgrom’s Leviticus: A Continental Commentary pg. 195). The Torah is thus specifically saying that by obeying this new revolutionary code that does away with the “religious technologies and paradigms” of the era, that nevertheless you will truly live.

The Rabbis in the Babylonian Talmud Yoma 88b make a Derasha and interpret this word, “Live” to mean that, ”One may violate [almost] any commandment of the Torah to save a life.” The peshat, plain meaning and historical context is as I have explained.  The Bible was understood by the classical rabbis to be an interpretive text in which one can anchor Oral traditions or Rabbinic laws. The interpretive engagement, though, does not eliminate the authorial intention of the text. (See Peshat & Derash: Plain and Applied Meaning in Rabbinic Exegesis by Rabbi David Weiss Halivni Oxford University Press, Chapter 1).

Rabbinic Midrash also has sources that reflect moral assumptions contrary to our own.  In explaining the sin of the Golden Calf, the rabbis commented, ”They [Israel] only worshipped the Golden Calf in order to permit themselves forbidden sexual relations in public.” (Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 63a) Why would the sin of idolatry per force lead to sexual vacuity?  The explanation is that by adopting, however superficially, the worldview that informs such worship, the moral worldview that permits a less restricted sexuality is activated and arouses no rebellion of conscience.  Nor does this worldview perceive these sexual acts in any way as an interpersonal offense.

The Midrash as well records that when the Jewish people were in Egypt, they, with the exception of the tribe of Levi, worshipped idols. (Mechilta Bo Parasha 5 and see Rambam Hilkhot Avodat Kochavim 1:3)  While this Midrashic tradition does not assume Israel performed sexual sins, it asserts that the Israelites were fully immersed in the Idolatrous culture. In a related Midrashic strand the Zohar Chadash teaches that the Children of Israel sunk to the 49^th level of spiritual impurity. (Parashat Yitro). It seems that it would be difficult to descend to the 49^th level of Spiritual Impurity while maintaining sexual discipline and holiness. One might get as far as the 30^th level but to get to the 49^th in a system with only 50 levels, you might very well need to be sexually depraved. Thus it will come as no surprise when Shmuel, in the Babylonian Talmud Yoma 75a, metaphorically interprets the verse in scripture where the Israelites complain, ”We remember the fish that we ate in Egypt for free…” (Numbers 11:5) to be a reference to the sexual license they enjoyed in Egypt.  Sexual license that includes: adultery, incest, homosexuality, and bestiality.

The sages indicate that the severity of Divine punishment for engaging in false weights and measures is harsher than that of engaging in illicit sexual relationships due to pragmatic concerns regarding the feasibility of repentance. The Talmud teaches, “[For] These [sexual sins,] repentance is possible, [for] these [weights and measures sins,] repentance is not possible,”(Yevamot 21a & Bava Batra 88b). The Rambam, in his Halakhic codex, however, offers instead the reasoning that, “For this [Forbidden Sexual Relations] is between a person and God and this [Weights and Measures] is between a person and a person.” (Sefer Nezikin Hilkhot Geneivah 7:12. Emphasis added). What the sages said was quite specific to the particular sin of weights and measures. Why the broad generalization pinpointing the interpersonal class of sins as a whole? His generalization implies that the category of interpersonal commandments is treated more severely than the category of those between a person and God.

I will offer two explanations: First, it has been observed by the Talmudic sages that there is a distortion of mind that takes place within the psyche of many a religious individual who somehow is highly reverential and devotional to God but not necessarily so, and sometimes inversely so, in relation to their fellow human beings. (Babylonian Talmud Yoma 23a) The Rambam is seeking to educate us that this is backwards. We do not hurt God by our lack of observance. We do however hurt ourselves, as well as others, by sinning interpersonally. Secondly, to err in God’s demands for us in our relationship to Him is understandable, as these are commandments that seek to raise us from the domain of a human being to a holy being and we are after all human. However, to fail in the domain of the interpersonal is to fail at being a human being itself and this is something that is a far worse desecration of God’s name than anything else. It is one thing for a Jew or Jewess to have a gap in the realm of the holy but to be severely distorted and lacking as a human being is intolerable.

It would be wise to end with a little known but highly relevant Midrash based on the verses in scripture that read, ”You shall do no unrighteousness in judgment, in meteryard, in weight, or in measure. Just balances, just weights, a just efa, and a just hin, shall you have: I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt.”(Leviticus 19:35-36) The Midrash teaches, “‘I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt’ on this condition I took you out of the land of Egypt on the condition that you accept upon yourself the commandment of just weights and measures…” (Sifra Parashat Kedoshim 8:10). According to this Midrash, the redemption from Egypt was conditional on the commitment to interpersonal business ethics. Strangely, there is no mention of Shabbat, Kashrut, Family Purity, and Sacrifices…How can this be explained? According to some scholars of the ancient Near East, Pagan religion concerned itself primarily with religious cult in the specific sense of care of the Gods. People worshipped Gods to secure a variety of needs.  Ethics were not a fundamental part of these religions and ethics made its way into the Greco Roman world primarily via philosophy. (see Lecture 2 From Jesus to Constantine: A History of Early Christianity by Professor Bart D. Ehrman University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). It would seem that in the view of the rabbis, the Torah is coming to fuse worship of God with interpersonal ethics. This can also explain why the two are commonly presented together, as we find in Parashat Kedoshim, where sacrificial law (Leviticus 19:5-8) is immediately followed by agricultural laws concerning the poor (Leviticus 19:9-11). The Torah has a dual focus. Individuals who focus on the worship of God to the neglect of their fellows are essentially more Pagan than Orthodox.

May we merit an integration of humanity and holiness that reflects positively on the Divine Image in which we were created and the path of Torah we have been chosen to live.

OU Kosher Kitniyot Mark

The Torah prohibits the consumption of Chametz on Passover. (Exodus 13:3)  Chametz is understood within the Rabbinic tradition to exclusively derive from the grains of: wheat, barley, oats, rye and spelt as only these grains are seen as undergoing a process of Chimutz (leavening) when contacted with water. (Babylonian Talmud Pesachim 35a) Kitniyot is a rabbinic term, classic examples of which are rice and millet that Ashkenazic Jewry gradually starting in the 13^th century and nearly universally by the late 17^th century decided to abstain from on Passover. (Yesodie Yeshurun Vol. 6 Ma’arechet Kitniyot) This custom developed despite these food items being permitted by Torah law, as they are not seen to undergo the process of Chimutz (Leavening) when contacted with water. Kitniyot has become an expansive classification and now includes a wide array of foods including: corn, legumes, various seeds and their derivatives and much ink and energy is spilt analyzing whether this food or that food should be considered Kitniyot.

Classic explanations of why the custom of Kitniyot is observed by Ashkenazic Jewry are that:

1. There is a concern that grains that can become Chametz could unintentionally become mixed in with Kitniyot.
2. There is concern that people will mistakenly come to eat grains that become Chametz due to confusing their identity or their forbidden status with those of Kitniyot which are permitted. This, given that flour/bread can be made out of some Kitniyot items or they are often both boiled in the process of cooking.

This essay will concern itself with the little known history of the criticism, opposition and at times defiance and subterfuge within the Ashkenazic rabbinic community itself to this ensconced custom.

My astute and somewhat brash teenage son Ezekiel once observed that “the difference between Modern Orthodox Judaism and Conservative Judaism is that Modern Orthodoxy complains about problems within Halakhic Judaism and Conservative Judaism actually does something about it!” I do sense that there is some significant truth in his observation, beyond any emerging teenage rebellion and indeed Rabbi Golinkin of the Israeli Conservative movement has authored a responsum permitting Kitniyot. Nevertheless, this article is intended within the Modern Orthodox tradition of “complaining” about aspects of halakhic tradition and not specifically “doing” anything about it. I say this despite my great personal dissatisfaction with this custom as I see it effectively as a potent obstruction to simple, accessible, affordable, healthy and well-rounded eating during the Passover holiday. The intention of this article is to foster intellectual ferment and as well let others who find this custom problematic know that they are far from alone and thus the title of this article “Misery Loves Company.” I will at the end of this article articulate a novel approach as to why I do observe the practice of abstaining from Kitniyot.

Let us begin with the Germanic sage Rabbi Yaakov Ben Asher’s (1269-1343) Halakhic Codex, the Tur, a staple of classic rabbinic learning and halakha.  Rabbi Ben Asher writes, ”There are those who forbid the consumption of rice and all manner of Kitniyot and cooked foods made thereof because [of concern that] wheat kernels become mixed up with them and this is an excessive stringency and we are not accustomed such.” (Orach Chaim Siman 453)

Rabbeinu Yerucham, a prominent French/Spanish early authority (1290-1350), in his classic halakhic work Toldot Adam Ve’Chavah writes, ”Those that have accustomed themselves not to eat rice and varieties of Kitniyot that were cooked on Pesach this is a foolish custom except if they are doing it to be stringent on themselves and I do not know why.” (Netiv Hey Chelek Gimmel 43a as brought in Bet Yosef on Tur Orach Chaim 493:A).

Rabbi Yaakov Emden, the son of the Chacham Tzvi (Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch ben Yaakov Ashkenazi 1656-1718) records in the name of his esteemed father that he would regularly be in pains over the custom of Kitniyot and say, ”If I had the power I would nullify this inferior custom which is a stringency that leads to a leniency…therefore I say one who nullifies this custom to abstain from eating Kitniyot my portion [in the afterlife] shall be with him if only the greatest Torah sages of the generation would agree with me…” (Mor U’Ketizyah Siman 453)

Beginning in the 19^th century there also appeared lone voices of rabbinic defiance against the historical weight of this custom who permitted Kitniyot. (see Teshuvot Chatam Sofer Orach Chaim Siman 122 and Teshuvah Me’Ahavah 1:259 where they are referenced) However, by that time the winds of halakhic and theological change had already started to blow and prominent rabbinic authorities during this time and after this time upheld the custom. (Teshuvot Tzemach Tzedek Orach Chaim Siman 56, Ma’amar Mordechai Siman 32, Teshuvot Maharam Mi’Brisk Siman 48 and Teshuvot Divrie Malkiel 1:28)  In doing so they emphasized either the obligatory nature of ancient protective customs that have been upheld for centuries and our inability to nullify them and/or the foundational quality that communal customs hold in the structure of Halakhic Judaism.

Perhaps the most interesting example of resistance towards this custom is that of Rabbi Saul Berlin, an 18^th century German Talmudist who inclined heavily to the emerging Reform movement. Having to lead a closet life of a traditional rabbi based on his education, family and official position, he authored several works either anonymously or under false identities that critiqued, ridiculed and through subterfuge sought to undermine Traditional Judaism and Halakha. One of his most famous and controversial works is that of a volume of responsas entitled “Besamim Rosh” which he attributed to the great medieval rabbinic authority Rabbeinu Asher who is a foundational pillar or Traditional halakha. In this work (Siman 348) he opines that the custom of Kitniyot is a foreign and in fact heretical implant within the Jewish people placed there by the Karaites. The Karaites were a heretical sect that emerged between the 7^th and 9^th centuries of the Common Era that denied that the Oral Law was of Divine origin but rather a purely rabbinic invention. He claimed that during one of the expulsions of Jews within Europe, a Karaite community was expelled with them and became mingled with them. This heretical community did not eat anything on Passover that flour and bread could be made out of as they rejected the Talmudic notion that only the five grains of: Wheat, Barley, Oats, Rye and Spelt could leaven. He provocatively claims that, ”Those that are stringent in observing this custom will be called to Divine account.” While it is as likely that the Karaites are the origins for the custom of Kitniyot as it is that Rabbeinu Asher is the author of the work Besamim Rosh nevertheless it is a fascinating example of rabbinic subterfuge in response to the perceived need for halakhic change.

Related to the classical explanations above for the reasons that the Kitniyot custom is observed is an interesting contemporary expression of rebellion from within Orthodoxy against the custom of Kitniyot. The iconoclastic Rabbi David Bar Chayim of the Machon Shiloh Institute (www.machonshiloh.org) claims that the classic explanations above that many are familiar with for the observance of the custom were later justifications for the custom. (See his article “Qitniyoth: A Qaraite Custom”) Whereas in his view the original reason for the custom was, that the Kitniyot that the French Rabbis who developed this custom based it on, were similar in their view to the classic 5 grains themselves and should be considered a minor form of Chametz. He notes that what is strange about such a basis for this custom is that this would directly contradict the Talmudic view that only the 5 grains of: Wheat, Barley, Oats, Rye and Spelt are capable in contact with water of leavening and are Chametz capable. This leads Rabbi Bar Chaim to consider that the basis for the latter more classic explanations (concern with wheat kernels getting mixed in or mistaken identity issues) were to lay a new foundation for the custom which had already taken root that seemed to reject or at a minimum not dovetail with explicit rabbinic law! Rabbi Bar Chaim is thus also led to opine that there may indeed be Karaite influence at play. Although, he offers no direct historical proof for this claim beyond the acknowledgment of the Rambam that there were Karaite customs that had made their way into the traditional Judaism of his time own time and by extrapolation could make their way into 12^th and 13^th century French Jewry. Rabbi Bar Chaim considers the custom of Kitniyot an erroneous custom and one that can simply be dropped. (See his response to the questioner “Are we bound to the Ashkenazi custom regarding Qitniyoth”) In what must be a strange twist of halakhic fate and methodology for him (as a staunch rejectionist of Conservative Judaism) he comes to the same Halakhic conclusion of Rabbi Golinkin of the Israeli Conservative Movement.

One note of necessary caution for Orthodox Jews waiting to jump ship is that while Rabbi Bar Chaim is a learned rabbi his writings on this subject have not to my knowledge been presented in the classical format of neither a well fleshed out rabbinic responsum nor a scholarly article in a rabbinic or academic journal where they can undergo the proper peer review where such claims whether they be halakhic or historical can be vetted. While his views are fascinating I at present must consider them speculative as they often on their website format lack even the presentation of source documentation and neither do they thoroughly engage the important halakhic issues involved with negating this custom that have been raised by his esteemed predecessors of which there are many. So I cite his views as part of the historical record and not at present to promote them.

In light of all this it is a fair question to ask why do I observe the custom of Kitniyot? After all, reasonable halakhic arguments can be marshaled against it and as both a modern and a staunch individualist, formal arguments that are somewhat reactionary about our alleged inability to nullify this custom do not really appeal even if I acknowledge that they are the accepted perspective within the contemporary Orthodox tradition.

From Jewlicious, 4/1/07

The reasons I observe the custom of Kitniyot are based primarily on spiritual intuition and could arguably be considered Neo-Hassidic in their approach, albeit a conservative approach within Neo-Hassidism. I sense that our Ashkenazic predecessors who developed this custom out of concern for observing Passover did so out of great piety and personal sacrifice –these people were deeply devoted to Halakha and God and I feel that to break this custom would be to fall out of harmony with the energy of commitment and devotion that they invested in it and which has been spiraling in the Ashkenazic Jewish community for some time. I would prefer to ride the wave of commitment and spiritual energy that they invested in this practice even though when I rationally consider it I find it problematic and apparently I am not alone. I am in question as to whether the intellect alone is a fitting instrument to decide on these matters and whether there is something beyond the intellect that requires consideration.

I also sense that to empower oneself and take on one’s shoulders the responsibility of changing Judaism is not a light matter, not psychologically and not spiritually. I need to exercise serious self-reflection as to my readiness and appropriateness for such a task even if only in my individual life. I need to thoroughly consider what are the potential pitfalls for such an undertaking and what have the experience and experimentation of others led to and how do I feel about the results. There is a saying that haunts me from within the rabbinic tradition that I find potentially applicable to the arena of the Philosophy and Kabbalah of Halakhic change: it teaches, ”Rabbi Shimon Ben Elazar says, ’If youth say to you build and elders say to you destroy listen to the elders and do not listen to the youth. For the building of the youth is destruction and the destruction of the elders is building…’” (Babylonian Talmud Nedarim 40a) Judaism requires innovation and interfacing in order to stay relevant to the society in which it finds itself. Nevertheless, there is a valid concern that not every innovation, leniency and theological development is necessarily ultimately constructive and not every holding on to tradition is necessarily ultimately destructive. Kitniyot may be as small as a grain of rice but perhaps the universe of Torah in all its complexity can be seen within it. May we be blessed to see with depth, honesty and integrity and develop a sustainable Judaism for the Here and Now.

The Babylonian Talmud in tractate Kiddushin 17a relates a story where Rav Acha at a wedding took the bride on his shoulders and danced with her. His somewhat perplexed rabbinic colleagues, while understanding of the mitzvah to bring joy to the bride and groom could not quite reconcile how he could have a woman on his shoulders given the distinct possibility for sexual stimulation this act could enjoin. They asked whether such Dionysian Mitzvah performance was permitted them as well and he responded, ”If your experience of her is like a beam of wood then fine but if not no.” Here we see that in the eyes of Rav Acha what the Halakha is in this particular instance is relativistic: it depends on the level of the person. It is also interesting that Rav Acha left the matter to their independent self-awareness and honesty and did not ask them to surrender their autonomy in this matter to an outside authority.

Another example found in the Babylonian Talmud tractate Shabbat 13a regards Ulla who, when coming home from the house of study, according to one version would kiss his sister on her chest and in another tradition her hands.  The Talmud as a lead-in to this anecdote is discussing what is the appropriate distance and boundaries between persons who are sexually forbidden to each other. The Talmudic direction is generally of the view that distance and abstention from physical contact is both necessary and appropriate. The case of Ulla’s actions are brought to bear as part of the dissenting school of Rabbi Pedat. In his view the issue is not physical contact or proximity per see but rather romantic or sexual intent that accompanies such physical contact and proximity. Of interest is that attributed to Ulla himself, is a teaching that states that any physical contact with a person sexually forbidden one is prohibited!

Tosafot, in his commentary on this anecdote (s.v. Upliga Adiydeh Adiydeh), explains that Ulla was known to be a righteous person and he knew himself well enough to know that this loving physical contact with his sister would not lead to inappropriate sexual stimulation. Tosafot references as proof our story of Rav Acha dancing with a bride on his shoulders, perhaps even more sexually stimulating in potential, as proof that such close physical contact is possible without inappropriate sexual intentions by a man of purity and attainment. In light of this teaching in Ulla’s name, the restriction of physical contact must be regarded as being applicable for those who have not attained this level of loving and pure intent and we have a second example where Halakha is relativistic. The spiritual level of the person involved dictates what the Halakha is.  It should be pointed out that the 16^th century codification of Jewish law, the Shulchan Arukh, does not retain this relativistic bent and sees as forbidden and problematic all such contact between siblings. (Even Ha’Ezer 21:7 and Chelkak Mechokek note

Moving on from these Talmudic anecdotes, there is as well in Rabbinic Halakha an established concept called Halakha Ve’Ain Morin Kain, ”It is the Halakha but we do not instruct it [to the public].” In these limited instances, a Torah scholar or learned person is permitted certain behavior the Halakha allows but these permissive rulings are not to be given or modeled to the public, lest it lead to undesirable results in the form of sin due to the possibility of the ill-applied implementation of the ruling. (see Encyclopedia Talmudit Vol. 9 Halakha Ve’in Morin Kain)

One relevant example of this regards wearing Teffilin (Phylacteries) in the evening. The Halakha is that this is permitted if one donned them prior to the evening but this Halakha is not to be taught lest a person fall asleep and lose control of their body processes while they are on which is forbidden by Halakha. (see Shulchan Arukh Orach Chaim 30:2) The Talmud records an incident where Rav Ashi was wearing Teffilin in the evening and when asked about this said this was only to guard against their being lost. This was a white lie to prevent the onlooker from doing the practice himself and potentially disregarding the Halakha of falling asleep in them. (see Talmud Menachot 36b and Shitah Mekubetzet ad loc. for a more complex read of this Talmudic debate and anecdote)

We also in Rabbinic Halakha have a concept of an Istinis: a sensitive or delicate person who is permitted certain leniencies others are not. Thus the Mishna in Berachot 2:6 records that Rabbi Gamliel washed himself in warm water on the night that his wife died which was understood to be forbidden. When respectfully questioned by his students he replied, ”I am not like everyone else I am a sensitive person.”

While in general Halakha is not relativistic I believe there are some lessons we can abstract from the above precedents.

One lesson that we can learn from the Talmudic precedents that deal with physical contact is to know who one is and not to be inhibited by social convention and expectations. Rav Acha in taking the bride upon his shoulders was in his spontaneity expressing his authentic and pure joy and was able to do so while maintaining a clear intent. How often do we interrupt ourselves from doing what we are called to do because of what others might say or think? How much do we live through the eyes of the other instead of in our own experience?

One lesson we can learn from the principle of, ”It is the Halakha but we do not instruct it [to the public]” is that we need to concern ourselves with how our actions that we model will be applied by others. One of the lessons learned in the cross-fertilization of the 60’s and Hassdisim was that not everything that is theoretically, according to some opinions, permitted by the Halakha with regards to sexual relationships should be done. At times various Hassidim followed the example of their Rebbe in this regard and it led to tragically broken marriages, destroyed reputations and disillusioned souls.

In the example of Rabbi Gamliel washing himself in warm water on the night of his wife’s death due to his sensitive disposition this leniency being an exception in his view to the general Halakah. While we cannot indiscriminately apply this across the Halakhic board, I do find a value in considering in what ways do we need to know what our sensitivities are in relation to Halakhic observance and its demands and finding ways within Halakha to work with them. There is ample rabbinic concern about the counter-productivity of Halakhic stringency voiced in the rabbinic phrase, ”It is a stringency that leads to a leniency.” (Talmud Bavli Pesachim 48b,Yevamot 30b, Bava Kama 11a and Niddah 24b) The rabbis understood that sometimes the insistence on halakhic stringency will drive an individual or group to sin euphemistically termed a “Leniency”. This is a concern that our generation and those committed to Halakha would be well advised to consider.

Ultimately these examples reflect a rabbinic regard for individuality and autonomy and in this they are distinctly resonant with modernity. It is not learning Torah or observance of the Halakha that leads to the obscuration of the individual but rather it is who one learns Torah from that potentially is the concern. Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Kotzk, known as the Kotzker rebbe, was once asked who was his greatest teacher. He replied, ”The person who taught me the Aleph Bet! Every other teacher taught me what to think; this one taught me this is an Aleph and this is a Bet [the foundations with which I could think].”

The Talmudic sages consider as religiously insane a seemingly normal religious individual who in various key moments acts in an insane manner, a manner where they are unable to navigate reality and appropriately discern between which Torah values and laws are appropriate to apply in a critical and defining instance. This failure to be able to navigate reality with the proper applications of Torah values and laws leads to demonstrably disastrous effects on other human beings.

Let us now explore three cases where the Talmudic sages label the misguided individual as religiously insane and see how the definition articulated above emerges from it.

The Babylonian Talmud in tractate Sotah 21b defines a man as a Chasid Shoteh (Religiously Insane) if, ”They see a woman drowning in a river and they say to themselves, ’It is not proper to gaze upon her and save her.’” In this instance the individual is unable to discern that the value of a human life takes precedence over his temporary and in the greater scheme of things non- consequential sexual stimulation. Here the issue is that the maintenance of sexual purity in thought and deed overwhelms what should be the spiritual instinct, value and law to respect and preserve human life.

The Jerusalem Talmud in tractate Sotah Chapter 3 Halakha 4 page 17a provides further examples worthy of our attention. First and similar to the illustration from the Babylonian Talmud above it describes a man, ”Who sees a child drowning in the river and says, ’When I take off my Teffilin (Phylacteries) I will save him.” The case assumes there is not sufficient time to do that and moreover he should not hesitate to even consider the Teffilin given the overriding priority of saving a human life and time being of the essence. (see Korban Ha’Edah commentary ad. loc) In this instance the sanctity with which Teffilin should ordinarily be treated and their preservation take precedence in the religiously insane mind over the sanctity of the life of the individual — a clear inversion of Halakhic values if ever there was one.

Another example the Jerusalem Talmud cites is where a betrothed maiden is being pursued to be raped and a man has the ability to save her;  he is permitted by law to kill the aggressor if necessary to save her; yet he refrains from involving himself out of concern for causing bloodshed to the aggressor. (See Pnai Moshe commentary ad. loc) Here again we are presented with a brutal portrayal of what the upending and distortion of religious priorities manifests as in the life of a religiously insane individual.  While the concern for shedding of blood is otherwise meritorious, the Torah likens such rape to murder (Deuteronomy 22:26) and the religiously insane individual is beholden to an absurd sense of respect for life.

While we can be appreciative that the Talmudic sages could, in the medical metaphor to be utilized herein, diagnose religious insanity, we need to inquire further as to how such religious insanity develops – what are its origins? In medical terms — what is its etiology? We also need to consider what is its pathology? That is, to examine what is the nature of the distortion — the mechanism — that is the direct cause of religious insanity. We will first address the nature of the pathology and then make our way to explore its etiology.

When one examines these examples provided by the Talmudic sages that deal with drowning or rape what is apparent is that in each situation there is a narrowing and organizing of consciousness around a certain value to the exclusion of another value. This narrowing blocks the individual’s ability to respond to reality in a truly creative and wholesome fashion. In this understanding religiously insane individuals suffer from a form of perceptual distortion, in the language of Gestalt psychology — what should become Ground remains Figure and what should emerge as Figure stays Ground. (see Gestalt Therapy: An Introduction section on Field Theory by Dr. Gary Yontef)  That is to say, that what needs to shift to the center of attention and prioritization is held in the background of attention and garners secondary status, and what needs to move into the background of a person’s attention stays front and center and is priority number one.  This narrowing is thus also accompanied by a rigidification around a value or law that while in ordinary circumstances is worthy, in the presenting circumstance is in dire need of setting aside.

When we turn to the etiology of religious insanity we inevitably become entangled in the Nature Vs. Nurture debate to which many resolve by transcending the “either / or” approach and substituting it with “this and that”. Likewise, we must allow that there are certain individuals who are prone to such narrowing and rigidification. We must as well consider that Rabbinic Judaism and its various expressions can, depending on the particular emphasis, exacerbate a pre-existing vulnerability or in some cases make individuals more prone to such issues. To best illustrate the etiology of religious insanity we need, like the Talmudic sages, to provide a contemporary illustration to support the above analysis.

Many of us have, to our hearts grief, heard of the recent episode in Bet Shemesh, Israel where an Ultra-Orthodox religious man spat on a young Orthodox girl who was not — in his view — dressed modestly enough. (see article Bet Shemesh Modesty Wars in Jewish Week by Michele Chabin) The girl conformed to the quite Orthodox standards of modesty in her own community, that has the misfortune of having its All Girl’s School in proximity to the community of this particular religiously insane individual. It should be pointed out the vast majority of the members of the more Ultra-Orthodox community did not engage in such vicious behavior but there have been instances where behavior similar in intention and quality has occurred.  This case presents us with the distortion and upending of religious values that are classic indications of religious insanity. The halakhic laws and values of: respect for human dignity, of loving your neighbor as yourself, of not damaging another person physically or psychologically are all dismissed in the abyss of fanaticism and what is present is the all-consuming value of modesty.

Dennis Prager, a Liberal Jewish thinker, once said that, ”The difference between an extremist and a moderate is that an extremist has one value; a moderate has two.” That is to say that an extremist has one value to which they have complete allegiance — to the exclusion of any other value. The moderate seeks to navigate between two values, which can be each going on their own independent trajectory and often compromises on and reigns in each of them to retain some portion of them both for a greater perceived good.

While modesty is clearly a Biblical and Prophetic value in relation to God as in, ”Do not ascend on steps my altar so that your nakedness not be revealed on it.”(Exodus 20:23)  and, ”Mortal! He told you what is good and what God seeks from you nothing more than to act justly, love kindness and walk modestly with your God.”   (Micah 6:8) This value of modesty morphs and expresses itself in rabbinic laws (see Shulchan Arukh Even Haezer 21:1-2) that apply to both women and men and it is not limited to what one wears but as well has to do with what we would call one’s way of being. Modesty includes yet transcends issues of sexuality and clothing and is related to humility, not drawing attention to one’s self and not wearing one’s righteousness on one’s sleeves. (Talmud Bavli Makkot 24a)

However, in the mind of the religiously insane of Bet Shemesh, what is Figure, what is center stage, is the supreme value of his limited and aggravated understanding of modesty which he narrowly and rigidly organizes around in his stupefying ignorance and boorishness.  So the diagnosis and pathology in this instance are clear; now let us turn to its etiology.

While we need to acknowledge that the individual men who are acting in a religiously insane manner are a minority of a minority, and it is fair to say that there is some internal propulsion within that makes them vulnerable to such religious insanity, we must as well look at the culture where they are raised and educated and determine to what extent if any this culture is a contributive factor to their mental and religious aberration.

Let us ask the following questions: If the society in which these men were raised instilled in them from the earliest of ages a profound respect for all human life, a deep respect for women as spiritual subjects not objects, a pervasive humility as well as a tolerance for difference do we imagine that such behavior as has taken the international stage could emerge in such an individual unless they truly were insane within DSM III standards? While there is no utopian Torah community, there are communities that stress differing values within Torah. We should not be surprised that when a community does not acknowledge, or is not disturbed by nor struggles with the misogyny and inequality within its own tradition, and when a community sees a value in focusing on the ever-increasing control of women’s bodies, clothing, hair, voices and very presence and perspective — we should not be surprised that such behavior amongst the weakest mental and moral links of this society act in a religiously insane manner. It is in fact entirely predictable as it is entirely horrifying to anyone with the minutest sense of moral conscience.  It is the author’s contention that the Ultra-Orthodox community as a whole, with its self-selected and signature implementation of pre-modern Torah ethos is fundamentally causal in the etiology of this particular manifestation of religious insanity.

Why is it we must inquire that Chabad Hassidism, which shares many of the faith assumptions, values and halakhic practices of Ultra- Orthodox Judaism, why is it inconceivable that such a religiously insane behavior like the one in Bet Shemesh could ever occur?  The answer in this regard is quite simple — the Chabad movement, and in particular its late Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson z”l prioritized the Biblical, Rabbinic and Hassidic value of Love of Israel on a global scale and as well the value of the tolerance and acceptance of our fellow Jew and Jewess. While I am not uncritical of Chabad nor am I a Chabad Hasid it is a clear illustration of within Ultra-Orthodoxy itself how emphasis on differing values leads to different results in the extreme. Could we imagine if every Chabad House were focused on enforcing some extremist reading of modesty in contrast to their fine work in developing Jewish literacy, involvement and continuity?  God save us!

We have covered diagnosis, pathology and etiology and what remains is treatment; perhaps the most complex of the four. While it would be simple to write a prescription of more well-rounded Torah and General education for the Ultra-Orthodox community, greater social contact and meaningful dialogue with other groups of Jewish people and perhaps some mass shamanistic sessions to get all the emotional genies out of the collective Ultra-Orthodox bottle, all of these have little hope of being implemented. Ultimately, Israeli society and the power of the state apparatus will need to insure the continuity of an intellectually open and honest discourse and the enhancement of civil and religious liberties as part of their preservation of the Zionist ideal of a free society. It is my hope that the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community will, prior to the messianic advent, be a fundamental and creative contributor to that effort for their sake and all of ours. It is very unwise for an Ultra-Orthodox minority to seek to utilize physical intimidation or political power to coerce conformity with its values and norms as this minority would not respond well to having the secular or halakhically liberal values and norms of the majority imposed on it. Thus at a minimum we need to insure that the Ultra-Orthodox community absorb the teaching, down to its lowest common denominator, of Hillel the sage, ”What is hateful to you do not do unto your friend…”(Talmud Bavli Shabbat 31a)

Updated Editor’s Note: Stan Kreis, a regular BJN contributor, took video of this Limmud Colorado panel with Rabbi Gavriel Goldfeder, Rabbi Marc Soloway, and Rabbi Josh Rose, which we link to below.  BJN appreciates Rabbi Soloway’s introductory remarks as well!

Thanks, Stan!

Editor’s Note: One of the participants at Limmud Colorado “live-blogged” the morning discussion among Rabbi Gavriel Goldfeder, Rabbi Marc Soloway, and Rabbi Josh Rose.

We are certain this is not the last we’ve heard in this engaging discussion. However, we are most appreciative to Chaviva Galatz for her diligence in capturing the discussion.  Check it out on her blog, The Kvetching Editor.

If you haven’t met her yet, learn a little about her in this video from Ignite Chanukah. Thanks, Chaviva!

It will perhaps then come as a modest surprise to the student of Judaism that the Classical and Hassidic Rabbis held a more complex and nuanced view of sin that paints a less than black and white image and understanding of this religious category. To be clear, the Classical and Hassidic Rabbis as one would imagine did not promote sin; this notoriety would be left to the 17^th century manic- depressive false messiah Shabtai Zvi who developed a pseudo-kabbalistic doctrine of “Redemption through Sin”. In this doctrine, certain sparks of holiness enveloped within evil, due to the primordial mythic shattering of the Divine Vessels, the antecedents of physical creation, could only be redeemed through sin. (see Redemption Through Sin in The Messianic Idea in Judaism by Professor Gershom Scholem) Nevertheless, the classical Rabbis did have some teachings that are sufficiently provocative that they deserve our attention and are required input if we are to understand what a broad Judaic view on the subject encompasses.

The first rabbinic concept we need to acquaint ourselves with is that of a, “Sin for the Sake of Heaven”. The meaning of this rabbinic terminology is — doing something that is clearly wrong (A Sin) but with good intention (For the Sake of Heaven).  The Babylonian Talmud in tractate Nazir 23b explores this concept and quotes Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak as stating that, ”Greater is a Sin done for the Sake of Heaven than a Mitzvah done not for the Sake of Heaven.” This teaching however brings to the surface a different rabbinic teaching, that of Rav who stated that, ”A person should always engage in the study of Torah and the performance of Mitzvot even when they are done not for the Sake of Heaven, for out of their being done not for the Sake of Heaven one will come to do them for the Sake of Heaven.” This counter teaching, which sees insincere Mitzvah observance and Torah study as having greater potential than a Sin for the Sake of Heaven, leads the rabbis of the Talmud to conclude that, ”A Sin for the Sake of Heaven is equal to a Mitzvah done not for the Sake of Heaven.”

In explanation, Sin for the Sake of Heaven has the virtue of pure intent and the liability of a sinful deed. Whereas a Mitzvah done not for the Sake of Heaven has the merit of a virtuous deed but the liability of a deficient intent, albeit one that can ultimately lead to a more sincere intent. It is worth noting that the upward spiritual mobility that the rabbis saw in a Mitzvah done not for the Sake of Heaven did not inspire them to value such an insincere Mitzvah as being of greater spiritual worth than a Sin committed for the Sake of Heaven.

One example that the classical Rabbis see as emblematic of Sinning for the Sake of Heaven is that of the Biblical heroine Yael. When Sisera, commander of the Canaanite army, was defeated in Battle he fled and hid in Yael’s tent. (Judges 4:17) Yael seduced Sisera and engaged in a quite heated evening of adultery. This for the purpose of weakening Sisera in what turned out to be in the Talmudic mind an exceptionally busy evening. (Nazir 23b) Then while Sisera naively slept in utter exhaustion, Yael killed him in her incarnation as a religious fem fatale. (Judges 4:22)

This rabbinic teaching on a Sin for the Sake of Heaven recognizes that sinning may at times be necessary and that if done with sincere intent it has legitimacy. True, it is not what Judaism is pointing to as an ideal, which would be sincere intent coupled with a clear cut virtuous deed, but Sin for the Sake of Heaven is as well not a priori rejected as an option. It is also worth noting that the methodology of studying Torah and doing Mitzvot insincerely with the assumption that they will lead to sincere religious life was not universally accepted and was specifically rejected by 19^th century Polish Hassidic Masters such as Rabbi Simcha Bunim of Przysucha and Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Kotzk when it did not truly motivate the person to raise their level of intention. (see The Quest for Authenticity: The Thought of Reb Simcha Bunim by Rabbi Dr. Michael Rosen z’l pg. 155)

When we further explore classical Rabbinic teachings on sin we also find a vein of both limited accommodation to sin and as well a policy of damage control. The Babylonian Talmud in tractate Kiddushin 40a begins with a teaching of Rabbi Chanina that, ”It is preferable for a person to commit a sin in private and not desecrate the name of Heaven in public.” The Talmud then quotes a teaching of Rabbi Elai the Elder, ”If a person sees that their inclination is overcoming them they should go to a place where they are not known and wear and cover themselves with black clothes and do what their heart desires and not desecrate the name of Heaven in public.“ The Talmud soon clarifies that this teaching is speaking about an individual that is truly unable to contain themselves and thus it is better that the reverberations of the sin be minimal. Here we have a rabbinic teaching that while not condoning sin seeks to work with human frailty in a way that we do not see reflected in Biblical literature. Many classic rabbinic authorities (Rabbeinu Channanel, Ritva, Meiri) presumably astonished by this tolerance for overwhelming impulsivity seek to read this teaching in a way that takes a step back from the accommodation to human eros it represents, but others (Tosafot Toch and Tosafot HaRosh) acknowledge that this indeed is what these rabbis espoused. (see Steinsaltz Iyunim on Kiddushin 40a ad. loc)

We also find a classical rabbinic teaching that sanctions the performing of a minor sin by a more educated and committed Jew (Chaver) so as to avoid a major sin by a less educated and devout fellow (Am Ha’aretz). Some rabbinic authorities define a “Minor Sin” as a violation of Rabbinic Law (Mishne La’Melekh on Hilkhot Terumot 3:17) whereas others see it as permitting even a Biblical violation of lesser stature and weight (Gittin 30b and Tosafot Yevamot 93b s.v. Ela). The source for this teaching is in the Babylonian Talmud tractate Eruvin 32b which records the halakhic view of Rabbi Judah the Prince, ”It is in the interest of a Chaver to commit a minor sin so that an Am Ha’aretz does not commit a major sin.” This view despite the prominence of its author as the compiler of the Mishna does not go unchallenged by no less than his father Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel. He opines that, “It would be in the interest of a Chaver for an Am Ha’aretz to do a major sin and he not commit even a minor sin.” We have here a profound debate as to what extent if any can a person compromise their own spiritual integrity to serve another’s spiritual integrity.

Lest our imagination run wild, the case in which this principle of Rabbi Judah the Prince emerges is dealing with Biblically mandated tithes where he holds that a Chaver could tithe in a less than appropriate fashion i.e. not in the location of the crop (Minor Sin) in order to prevent the Am Ha’aretz from eating produce (that he provided the Am Ha’aretz) that would go without being tithed at all (Major Sin).  This view of Rabbi Judah the Prince does find itself being utilized in the halakhic responsa literature as a viable halakhic principle well beyond the issue of tithes. (see Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef’s Yabia Omer Part 4 Even Ha’Ezer Siman 4 for one contemporary example within the Ultra-Orthodox Sefardic community)

In this classical rabbinic teaching of Rabbi Judah the Prince we see that our responsibility for our fellow Jew and Jewess may under certain circumstances potentially call those of greater education and devotion to be willing to diminish their own potential conformity to the Halakha in its purist expression in order to mitigate against a greater damage to the religious life of a fellow Jew and Jewess. This could be called by analogy the path of a Halakhic Bhodisattva.

The classical rabbis also recognize what we would define as a lesser of two evils approach in relation to sin where the rabbis would prefer people to sin in ignorance rather than inform them of the wrongdoing and have them transgress willfully — assuming of course this is the probable result. The latter, willful transgression, is seen as the greater wrong and is to be avoided. In rabbinic terminology, ”It is better that they be unintentional sinners and not intentional ones.” (Talmud Bavli Shabbat 148b)

There is as well a willingness on the part of the classical rabbis at times to permit something that ordinarily would be forbidden, or look the other way in order to prevent an individual from transgressing in that matter in its forbidden state! In rabbinic terminology, ”It is better that Israel eat meat from an animal that is on its way to death that is slaughtered [in the halakhic procedure] and they not eat meat from an animal that has already died.”(Talmud Bavli Kiddushin 21b) In explanation, Halakha forbids the consumption of an animal that would die from mortal wounds or specific illnesses even if the animal had been properly slaughtered by a ritual slaughterer. Halakha also forbids eating a Kosher species of animal that died naturally absent ritual slaughter. (Mishne Torah Hilkhot Ma’acholot Assurot 4:1, 4:7-9) What this teaching is informing us is that the classical rabbis felt that eating the meat of an animal that died on its own is a more severe sin than eating the meat of an animal that would die but nevertheless was slaughtered.

The rabbis derive this principle of preferential sin from the Torah’s granting of an Israelite soldier permission in time of war to take even a married Gentile woman captive and essentially convert her and marry her — I will spare you the debate regarding when he is permitted to have sexual relations with her. (Deuteronomy 21:10-14 and Steinsaltz Iyunim of Kiddushin 21A) We will need to bracket the issue at present of the rather belated Geneva Conventions and their relation to Biblical morality and laws pertaining to war. Thus we see that the classical rabbis did not at all times and under all circumstances see the Torah as a zero sum game where either one lives in an ideal manner or not at all and they were even willing in limited circumstances to allow Halakha to be turned into somewhat of a pretzel to help Israel avoid sin. This Talmudic principle and analogous ones like it, for instance, ”It is better that they eat the gravy [of the forbidden fat] and not the forbidden fat itself” were adopted by later rabbinic authorities in concert with other halakhic considerations for leniency to as well permit the otherwise forbidden. (see Responsa of the Rambam Pear Ha’Dor Siman 132 for a case regarding Conversion)

The Babylonian Talmud in tractate Menachot 44a tells a rather wild story that while overtly seems to stress the reward in this world for the Mitzvah of Tzitzit (and Mitzvot in general), on a more subtle level tells us as well something about how the classical rabbis viewed sin in some circumstances. The story goes that there was a wealthy man who was very fastidious about observing the commandment of Tzitzit. Nonetheless, he was highly vulnerable to his libidinal urges and developed an active interest in illicit relations with prostitutes. The man hears of a highly expensive Gentile prostitute in a rather far away locale within the Roman empire and sends her fee of 400 Gold Dinars in advance, perhaps hoping that you get what you pay for. He arrives and is led to an erotic set up of seven beds one on top of the other –the first six of silver and the last of gold, all with fine linens with the prostitute laying naked on the top bed. He disrobes and begins his ascent and the Tzitzit begin to pelt him in the face. It is not clear whether this is meant literally as a magical episode or metaphorically as meaning that they aroused his conscience. He comes down from the ladders connecting the beds and sits down and the woman as well comes down and sits besides him. She is astonished and expresses a desire to know what he found wrong with her. He poignantly shares with her that she is the most beautiful woman he has even seen (apparently this was not his first such visit), it’s just that in this instance his Tzitzit reminded him of his accountability in this world and the next and simply deflated his ardor. The woman demands his name, the name of his city, rabbi and house of study and she bids him goodbye. She then proceeds to divide her possessions and treks to her failed paramour’s hometown and seeks an appointment with his rabbi. She asks to convert and explains the story of what inspired her and her request is granted. The rabbi in his parting words encouraged her to marry the lustful but conscience ridden student and the rabbis observe, ”Those fine linens that she prepared for him illicitly she may now prepare for him with halakhic sanction.”

This is quite a strange story even on a surface level as it is employed to demonstrate the “reward” for the Mitzvot, in this case Tzitzit. The lustful man is rewarded with the ability to now marry and have a permanent, sanctified and more cost-effective relationship with the most beautiful woman he has ever beheld.   For our purposes the relevance of the story points to a rabbinic view that sees the outcome of the intention to sin, and for that matter a lifestyle of sin itself, as having at times a rebound effect where a greater good can result from the trajectory of sin embarked on. In the words of Dr. Claudio Naranjo, a Fourth Way Psychologist quoting a popular wisdom teaching, ”The Devil knows not for whom he works.” (Character and Neurosis: An Integrative View-Introduction) Many people on the spiritual path can relate to the notion that if they had not gone through certain blind alleys, dead ends and misguided life choices they may never have arrived at a place of greater spiritual maturation.  It is sometimes out of our greatest personal darkness that we eventually reveal and experience our greatest light.

Let us now turn our attention to select Hassidic masters within the 19^th century Polish school of Hasidism.

The Babylonian Talmud in tractate Gittin 43a debates the issue of whether a half-freed slave-woman can be betrothed. The sage Rabah is initially inclined to say no and after hearing the reasoning of his colleague Rav Chisdah reverses his opinion and considers himself in error in his original position. He then after quoting a verse in scripture where the Torah is referred to as a stumbling block (Isaiah 3:6) states, ”A man does not establish himself in Torah unless he stumbles in it first.” (Ain Adam Omed Al Divrie Torah Ela Im Ken Nichshal Bahen Techilah). The plain meaning of this rabbinic statement is referring to issuing halakhic rulings in Torah and the inevitable errors of logic and interpretation that are part of the process of learning for a rabbi. When the sage errs and is corrected by his colleagues this advances his learning process. (see Rashi s.v. Ve’Hamchshalah)

In the Hassidic teachings of Rav Tzadok Hakohen of Lublin this teaching takes on a much broader application and he sees this pathway of error and stumbling as being relevant to a person’s struggle for spiritual attainment in Divine Service and understanding of the Torah. He writes, ”That in truth so established the blessed God for by means of a person’s efforts and actions they will attain all the spiritual levels and therefore even though in the beginning this draws one to stumbling, nevertheless by means of this stumbling they reach and establish themselves on the words of the Torah.”(Likutie Ma’amarim Amud 13)

Professor Moshe Idel in his work Kabbalah: New Perspectives describes Hassidism as, ”The Psychologization of Kabbalah” here we have Hassidism as the, ”Psychologization of the Talmud.” What in the Talmud is an observation about the process of issuing Halakhic rulings, in Rav Tzadok’s spiritual hand becomes a guide for the personal journey of the spiritual aspirant. We learn by mistakes, by at times committing sins but if we are sincere these sins teach us and we come to an eventual place of spiritual integrity. Here we see that sin can have a constructive contribution to spiritual development. We need not seek sin out as we are reliable to find it without effort — it is part of the human condition.

We will conclude with what is by far the most radical teaching within the 19th century Polish Hassidic tradition in relation to sin — the notion that sinning can at times be God’s will. Paradoxical as this sounds, as conventionally we would consider sin to be the opposite of God’s will, in the antinomian mind of Rabbi Mordechai Yosef Leiner of Izbica, not so.

In his work Mei Hashiloah redacted by his grandson it states, ”With regards to certain things in the Holy Torah, when it is clear to a person that now is the time for the Lord to work, as Elijah did on Mt. Carmel, then it is necessary to overturn the general principles of the Holy Torah and act only in accord with the understanding [binah] that God infuses to man. Rabbi Nathan says that when the understanding is not present, the person is required to conduct himself in accord with the manifested general rules of the Torah without transgressing the bounds of the Halakha.  Rabbi Nathan further says, when a person’s heart strives after the will of God and he removes from himself all personal attachments, God summons him to do an act which seems to him to transgress the principles of the Torah, heaven forbid. It is concerning this case that Rabbi Nathan said that a person whose heart strives after the Lord and has removed from himself all personal gain can be certain that it will not be counted as a sin, heaven forbid. He can be certain that it was a time for the Lord to work. (All is in the Hands of Heaven: The Teachings of Rabbi Mordechai Yosef Leiner of Izbica by Dr. Morris Fairstein pg. 38)

The Mai Hashiloah does teach elsewhere that this teaching is not intended for casual application and is intended for a ”Holy man”. (Mei Hashiloah, Volume I Parashat Kedoshim s.v. Ish Imo Ve’aviv.) I would also point out that when one considers what we know of the life of Rabbi Mordechai Yosef it would seem that the most radical actions he ever took perhaps in fulfillment of this teaching were to break from the Kotzker rebbe who was his teacher and perhaps to pray one of the three formal prayers at a later time than prescribed by Halakha! So we need to be circumspect in applying this teaching if at all.

By way of explanation of this teaching there is a verse in Psalms 119:126 that reads, ”It is a time to act for God they have made void your Torah.” (Et La’asot La’Hashem Heyfiru Toratecha) in the piece quoted above the author translates the verse, ”It’s a time for the Lord to work…” Regardless, this verse in Psalms was utilized by the classical rabbis to underpin the Torah’s granting emergency powers on a temporal basis to set aside Torah law with the rarest of commandments excluded from this permission. (see the author’s essay Emergency Halakha in the Rabbinic Tradition in Millin Chavivin Rabbinic Journal of Yeshivat Chovevei Torah) Rabbi Moderchai Yosef Leiner is taking a teaching that generally was seen as only to be utilized by Prophets and establishment rabbinic authorities and in general for the collective benefit of Israel, the Torah or a specific Jewish community and is applying it to the spiritual life of a holy man i.e. a true Hasid. The notion that in however limited circumstances in the life of the individual what would by convention be considered a sin is in fact God’s will is a teaching that while certainly invigorating in its radical nature is also deeply concerning in regards to an individual’s ability to make responsible use of it absent the natural human proclivity towards rationalization. I believe this teaching is the appropriate climax of our studies and I will close with some brief remarks that hopefully serve in the capacity of spiritual brakes for those however few who may be in need of them.

The intention of this essay is to share with the student of Judaism a broader understanding of the religious category of sin as related to by the Classical and Hassidic Rabbis. The life process, spiritual journey and human beings are often not simple and it would be a shame for people to have a sense that the rabbis of our tradition saw sin, which as it is has such heavy and today Christian intonations, in black and white terms. These teachings as a whole clearly portray a more nuanced and sophisticated view of sin than what some might have expected.  The depth of thought that these teachings point to hopefully will garner additional respect for the Rabbinic and Hassidic tradition. I feel it only responsible to add that the Rabbinic tradition is more complex that what this brief essay can reflect and in order to gain a fuller understanding of how sin was viewed we would need to attend to other more conservative teachings that seem to go in a different direction. Teachings that require our understanding and potential reconciliation are ones that express concern and rejection of, ”A Mitzvah that comes about through Sin.” (Talmud Bavli Berachot 47b and Succah 30a) and the rhetorical rabbinic question to be answered in the negative ,”Do we say to a person sin so your friend can merit?” (Talmud Bavli Shabbat 4a) It should also be mentioned that the Izbica Hassidic work Mei Hashiloah failed to garner an approbation from a single Hassidic Rebbe of its time. It is the author’s hope that this essay stimulates the reader’s interest in the depths of Rabbinic and Hassidic thought and as King Solomon says, ”If you quest for it as silver and seek it as hidden treasure then you will understand the awe of God and attain knowledge of the Divine.”(Proverbs 2:4-5)

The Friday night Shabbaton begins at 6:30 pm and will include a delicious three course Shabbat dinner. A children’s program will run simultaneously to the meal and presentation.

On Shabbat morning – February 4^th - Rabbi Miller will lead an instructional Shabbat morning services with kabalistic insights and meditations. Services will be followed by a luncheon.

Dinner begins at 6:30 pm lecturer at 7:45 pm. To make a reservation please follow this link or call 303.429.5177. Click here for more info.  Chabad of NW Metro Denver is located in Westminster on 4505 W 112 Ave.

Question: Why is it important for me to know the mystical insights to prayer? I enjoy the social synagogue atmosphere, the rabbi gives a good sermon and the cholent and kiddush is worth the wait. What more could there be to services?
Rabbi Miller: Because we don’t know how to pray, we try to make the Synagogue experience enjoyable with other activities: food, music or a speech. But most of the services are actually about praying so it’s important that we get some direction how to do that. Good, mystically inspired prayer will help you to be more centered, less fragmented and will put you more in touch with your inner self. To pray with devotion may be difficult, but to pray without it is ludicrous.

Question:  The Shabbat program at Chabad will reflect your latest book that you published, a Friday night synagogue prayer book.  What motivated you to begin focusing on prayer after having publishing two very successful works on the Five Books of Moses (the Lifestyle and Gutnick edition among many other books?
Rabbi Miller: People have the false impression that Rabbis and religious people know how to pray, and others do not. In my experience, that’s not true. Almost everybody nowadays is confused when it comes to prayer. The synagogues overemphasize tradition and external behavior and lose touch of the introspective and the metaphysical. Most prayer commentaries do not help much because they read like a history book: When was this prayer introduced? By whom? etc. So I wanted to redress this problem by writing a prayer commentary which is entirely focused on emotional and spiritual insight.

Question: How does your non-religious up-bringing reflect your understanding and appreciation for prayer?
Rabbi Miller: In my childhood I was deeply alienated by the Synagogue experience. I was definitely interested–look, I became a Rabbi in the end—but there was nothing there for me. I relate deeply to why Jews find the Synagogue experience difficult and now I have the knowledge and experience to help alleviate the problem.

Question: Many people don’t care for the synagogue but like to pray privately at home, will your Friday evening presentation offer tools for solo prayer?
Rabbi Miller: Yes, absolutely. Prayer is an art that can only be mastered through repeated practice. Not many people are able to come to the synagogue on a daily basis and it’s important that praying privately is seen as something desirable.

Bonus Question: When I hear suggestions about meditation during prayer I think of some type of voodoo experience. Can you describe briefly what type of prayer meditation you will be suggesting and why you think they are useful?
Rabbi Miller: The Bible describes prayer as a “ladder,” because it’s an experience that you ascend one rung at a time. The Jewish prayer book (siddur) was written to guide you up this ladder, step by step. At each junction, I will offer some guidance as to the type of emotional work you should be doing at this point. I’m also going to convey some the way Kabbalists imagined what is happening spiritually at that point. These ideas are refreshing and mind-expanding. Indirectly, they help to lift us out of the daily rut that we often find ourselves in and help us to foster a broader, more integrated and holistic approach to life.

Rabbi Chaim Miller

Rabbi Chaim Miller is a leading international authority for interpretation of Jewish Bible and mysticism, specifically the Torah-related works of the late Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem Schneerson (1902-1994). His scholarly achievement, at the tender age of 37, is substantiated by the vast dissemination of his works, as well as the acclaim they have won him among his colleagues and in the educational and religious communities in which the works circulate.

Born and raised in London, England, Miller studied at the prestigious Haberdashers’ Aske’s School for Boys. He began to explore the depth of his religion while at England’s Leeds University through extensive reading and personal introspection. Fascinated by Jewish mystical teachings in particular, he took a year off to learn at a Lubavitcher yeshiva. Five years later he was an ordained rabbi practicing in Leeds, running both a synagogue and a yeshiva, and writing in his spare time what would soon become the “Gutnick Chumash.”

In 2004 Rabbi Miller relocated to the United States with the intention of devoting himself almost entirely to the writing and editing of great Jewish liturgy for Kol Menachem. Since this time he has completed the groundbreaking “Kol Menachem Chumash (Gutnick Edition),” the “Slager Edition Haggadah” — the bestselling work in its genre — and two volumes of a landmark series exploring Rambam’s Thirteen Principles of Faith.

Rabbi Miller’s texts are currently used at some of the nation’s top institutions, including New York University and Yeshiva University. In addition, over 1,000 rabbis in the United States use Rabbi Miller’s texts to teach their students and prepare their sermons.

Rabbi Miller’s publications have received the attention of community leaders and various persons of note. In 2008, President George W. Bush sent the “Slager Edition Haggadah” to the troops in Iraq as a representation of the Jewish faith for the United States military. The Haggadah was a recent recipient of the prestigious Benjamin Franklin Award just this past year, and Miller’s “Gutnick Chumash” is on display at the Jewish Children’s Museum in Brooklyn, New York. The popular “Dummies” series published “The Torah for Dummies” in 2008, with author Arthur Kurzweil singling out Rabbi Miller’s “Gutnick Chumash” and proclaiming, “If I could have only one translation on a desert island, it would be this one.”

See also
Torah in Ten 

Kol Menachem 

The Huffington Post